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1 Introduction
A substantial empirical literature has emerged on the relationship between income and health
care demand following the seminal work by Grossman (1972). The interest stems from an
attempt to understand the determinants of health expenditure and its share of household or
national incomes. A fundamental question is the nature of health care as an economic good: the
expectation that health spending would increase disproportionately more as income increases
if health care is a luxury good and disproportionately less if it is a normal good. Numerous
studies have examined this question by quantifying the income elasticity of health care (e.g.,
Gerdtham and Jo¨nsson 2000; Getzen 2000; Costa-Font et al. 2011).
However, the empirical evidence remains subject to criticism. A main critique of the exist-
ing econometric work is that the estimates of the income–health spending relationship are not
causal, because most studies are based on simple correlations between income, health expendi-
ture, and health care use. The assumption that income is exogenous is likely to be violated as
the income–health expenditure nexus is filtered by a variety of confounding effects. For example,
the demand for health care is associated with health behaviors (e.g., smoking, exercise), which
are affected by education, cognitive ability, and health knowledge (Cutler and Lleras-Muney
2010). These attributes are also correlated with income. Further endogeneity issues potentially
arise when current income is used as a measure of household resources, because individuals in
poor health may be less likely to participate actively in the labor market, but at the same time
consume more health care. Omitted factors such as non-cognitive skills can further compound
the endogeneity problem, for example, if individuals with higher perceived sense of control are
more likely both to seek health care services and to earn higher incomes (Cobb-Clark et al.
2014).
A second critique is that the literature has largely been silent on the role of health care
heterogeneity. Existing studies do not distinguish between preventive and curative health ser-
vices, or between health care from the public and private sectors. It might be expected that
the relationship between income and the demand for preventive care would be different from
that of curative care. Preventive care is conceptualized as a human capital investment and is
strongly influenced by education and income (Kenkel 2000; Wu 2003). Curative care behavior,
in contrast, is driven by immediate need rather than choice, and hence, income is less likely
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to be important. This is particularly true for public health systems where monetary barriers
on access to health care, in principle, should not exist. However, access to health care in the
private sector should be significantly determined by income, as with any other normal good.
This study addresses both issues simultaneously. First, to create a setting as close as possible
to the idealized laboratory experiment, we use data of lottery winners to estimate the effect of
income on the utilization of health care services in the United Kingdom, a country where 50%
of the population play the lottery. We follow the same testing strategy as Gardner and Oswald
(2007) and Apouey and Clark (2015), who use the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to
study the effect of lottery wins on mental and physical health, and Lindahl (2005), who analyze
the impacts on health status and mortality using Swedish data.
Our study contributes to the literature by investigating the effect of exogenous income on
health care use in an institutional context where a private health sector coexist alongside a
National Health System, and is often intermediated by private insurance schemes. In these
health systems, a windfall of income might simply lead individuals to switch from publicly
funded health care to private health care. Our paper complements a handful of related studies.
A very recent paper by Cesarini et al. (2015) uses administrative data on lottery players in
Sweden and finds that lottery wealth affects neither mortality nor health care utilization. A
handful of studies from the US, which has a different health system from that of the United
Kingdom, employ a variety of strategies to estimate causal effects of income on health care
expenditures. For example, Acemoglu et al. (2013) use oil price shocks and variations in the
dependency of economic subregions on oil to estimate the income elasticity of hospital spending.
Three other studies exploit the Social Security benefit notch as a source of exogenous variation
in incomes of senior citizens on prescription drug use (Moran and Simon 2006), long-term care
services (Goda et al. 2011), and out-of-pocket medical expenditure (Tsai 2014).
Previewing our results, we find that lottery winners with larger wins are more likely to
choose private health services as opposed to health services from the National Health Service.
The positive effect of wins on the choice of private care is driven largely by winners with medium
to large winnings (win category > £500 (or US$750); mean = £1922.5 (US$2,893.5), median
= £1058.2 (US$1592.7)). For privately-insured individuals, larger winners are more likely to
obtain private care for dental services and for eye, blood pressure, and cervical examinations.
3
For individuals without private insurance, lottery wins have no effect on the choice of public
or private care. We find that medium to big winners are more likely to have private medical
insurance. Large winners are also more likely to drop coverage earlier, possibly after their
winnings have been exhausted. The elasticities with respect to lottery wins are comparable in
magnitude to the elasticities of household income from fixed effect models.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data
and discuss the estimation strategy. In Section 3, we discuss the results from the empirical
analysis. In Section 4, we present the implied income elasticities of health care. Finally, Section
5 concludes with a discussion of the key findings in the paper.
2 Data and Methods
2.1 Data
The main data source used in the analysis is the BHPS, which is a nationally representative
random sample of households, containing over 25000 unique adult individuals. The survey is
conducted between September and Christmas of each year from 1991 (see Taylor et al. 2001).
Respondents are interviewed in successive waves; households who move to a new residence are
interviewed at their new location; if an individual splits off from the original household, the
adult members of their new household are also interviewed. Children are interviewed once they
reach 11 years old. The sample has remained representative of the British population since the
early 1990s.
We study the use of health care services of a panel of lottery winners in the BHPS. Data
on lottery wins were collected for the first time in 1997 and are available for 12 waves (Waves
7–18). In the survey, respondents were asked to state whether they received windfall income
from lottery wins and the amount of winnings. We focus on all lottery winners at the year of
winning the lottery. The complete case sample for analysis consists of 14205 observations (6520
individuals). Of those, 94.8% are small wins (£1–£499), and 5.2% are medium to large wins
(£500+) (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). The average real lottery win (adjusted to consumer
price index in 2000) is £157 (or US$236).1 Many individuals won the lottery more than once
1The mean, and median, wins for each of the winning category are: £30.0, £18.9 (< £100); £163.1, £164.3
(£100–£250); £366.5, £369.3 (£250–£500); £1922.5, £1058.2 (> £500.)
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in our panel. For example, from 1997, the average number of “years of winning the lottery”
for the same person is 2.17, with a standard deviation of approximately 1.8 years. This implies
that there are likely to be some individuals who play repeatedly.
Data on health service utilization have been collected in the BHPS since 1991 (Wave 1). In
each year of the survey, individuals were asked whether they had been admitted into hospital as
an inpatient and whether they had health checkups. The recall period is the 1st of September
of the preceding year. The list of health checkups includes checks for blood pressure, chest
X-ray, cholesterol, dental care, eye test, and for females, cervical and breast examinations.
Individuals who reported having been hospitalized, or having had checkups, were asked if these
were obtained through the National Health Service (NHS), the private sector, or both. For
the purpose of analyzing the public or private type of the health service use, we combine the
responses that indicate “use of private sector” and “use of both private and public sectors” into
one category.
Table 1 presents the proportion of individuals who have used health care and, conditional
on having used health care, the proportion that chose private (non-NHS) services. For example,
65% of lottery winners reported having used dental care, 9.3% had an overnight hospitalization,
and 26% of all females received a cervical examination. Of those who had dental treatment, 29%
obtained care from private providers; 8.3% of individuals who were hospitalized chose private
hospital care.
The remaining explanatory variables that were used in the study can be classified into the
following categories: demographic and socioeconomic characteristics (e.g., age, gender, edu-
cation), household income, measures of health status (self-assessed health, presence of health
problems), and metropolitan region identifiers. Of particular interest is whether individuals
have private medical insurance (PMI). Respondents who are covered by the insurance in their
own name (as opposed to through a family member) were asked whether the coverage had
been paid for directly, deducted from wages, or paid by employer. The summary statistics for
these explanatory variables in our sample of lottery winners are shown in Table A.1, with the
sample characteristics of non-winners (at the year of the survey) shown in the same table for
comparison. Lottery winners are more likely to have PMI (19.7%) compared to non-winners
(14.8%). Additionally, winners have higher household income, are more likely to be males, and
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are employed fulltime.
In the analysis of the effect of lottery wins on health care use, it would be desirable to
control for any unobserved heterogeneity in participating in the National Lottery. A key reason
why we focus on lottery winners at the year of winning is because the BHPS does not contain
information about the number of times (if any) the individual has played the lottery. Hence, we
cannot distinguish non-players from unsuccessful players.2 Nevertheless, in Britain, as opposed
to a number of other countries, many people play lotteries; a recent survey-based estimate
by Wardle (2007) places the proportion of lottery players at two-thirds of the British adult
population, with 57% playing the National Lottery (and almost 60% of these playing at least
once a week). This explains why there is a considerable number of repeated lottery winners in
the BHPS data compared with any other nationally representative data set.
2.2 Econometric strategy
We model the utilization of health care by using a two-part model that has been extensively
used in the empirical analysis on the demand for health care. The first part is a binary outcome
model that distinguishes between users and non-users of a given health care service. The second
part is a separate binary outcome model that describes the distinction between users of private
(non-NHS) health care versus NHS health care, conditional on being a user. The model is
specified as follows:
yit = βwit + x
′
itδ + αi + it (1)
where yit represents the health care utilization measure; wit denotes the amount of lottery
winnings; x′it represents a vector of covariates; and β and δ are coefficients to be estimated.
In our primary analysis of lottery wins and health care use, we focus on lottery winners
at the year of the survey instead of winners and non-winners to minimize the presence of
unobserved heterogeneity that influences both the decision to participate in lotteries and health
care behaviors. However, this strategy does not account for potential unobserved heterogeneity
among lottery winners, which may arise if large winners play more lotteries, and if the difference
2The Swedish study by Cesarini et al. (2015) uses information on the number of lottery tickets lottery players
bought where winners of a large prize are compared with similar individuals that did not win a large prize with
an identical number of tickets.
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in playing behavior is systematically related to the intensity of health care use. For example,
some individuals may have an inherent characteristic that leads them to spend an invariably
large proportion of their income on lottery tickets every week, and are therefore more likely to
accumulate higher windfalls within the 12 months period than others. This is manifested in
the model where the individual-specific effect, αi, is correlated with covariates wit and x
′. To
eliminate this effect, we apply “within” transformation to Equation (1), which yields:
y˜it = βw˜it + x˜
′
itδ + e˜it (2)
where the tilde denotes deviation from the sample averages. Equation (2) is commonly referred
to as the fixed effects “within” estimator.3
To aid the interpretation of our results and to allow comparability across different types of
health services, we standardize all our binary outcome variables across the entire sample to have
a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. This enables us to directly interpret the estimated
coefficients as standard deviation changes in health service use and/or private versus NHS type.
In a secondary analysis, we investigate if lottery wins are systematically related to individuals
propensity to take up PMI. For this analysis we use a sample of individuals who have won the
lottery at least once in the panel, i.e. “ever winners”. This is because the proportion with PMI
among winners (19.5%) is uncharacteristically higher compared with the entire sample (12.0%)
so we would not expect that uptake of PMI to be significantly different between winners with
larger wins compared to smaller wins. We regress PMI status on various configurations of
lottery wins among winners at the year of winning, namely “Any wins,” large wins or “Wins
> £500,” and lottery win categories (“< £100,” “£100−£250,” “£250−£500,” “> £500”).
The reference category consists of individuals who have won the lottery at least once in the panel
and are non-winners in a given year. The decision to use the “ever win” sample is justifiable
on the ground that every individual in this sample can be considered as lottery players who, in
the literature, are thought of as distinguishably different from permanently non-players.
We expect that the decision to purchase medical insurance is influenced by both observed
characteristics (e.g. age, health status) and unobserved characteristics (e.g. risk aversion) and
the latter aspect needs to be accommodated in the econometric modelling. As a result we
3All of the paper’s results can be replicated with limited dependent estimators. However, as a pedagogical
device and for ease of reading, we use standardized linear methods.
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estimate a model of insurance status among the sample of ever winners using within estimation.
This estimates the within-individual variation in PMI status, and has the interpretation of a
change in insurance status.
As an auxiliary analysis we also examine whether lottery winners who take up PMI drop
their insurance coverage more quickly. We discuss the findings of our econometric analyses in
Section 3 below.
3 Results
3.1 Effect of lottery wins on utilization and private versus NHS care
Table 2 presents the coefficient estimates on lottery wins on whether lottery winners used
health services in a given year, and whether users of health services chose to obtain private
(non-NHS) or NHS services. As mentioned at the end of Section 2.2, the binary dependent
variables are standardized to facilitate comparability across different types of health services.
The coefficient estimates are interpreted as standard deviation changes in health service use
and/or private versus NHS type for a 10% increase in lottery wins. We consider how our
estimates on lottery winnings vary for different specifications of household income, which is
added as a control variable, along with an extensive set of covariates described in Section 2.
The different specifications are household income net winnings, lagged household income, and
when household income is omitted from the regression.
The results in Table 2 indicate that lottery wins have little to no effect on the utilization
of health care services. This is observed from columns (1), (3), and (5) whereby most of
the coefficient estimates are not statistically significant from zero. These results indicate that
winners with larger lottery wins are not more likely to use health services. Moving onto the
effect of lottery wins and the choice between private versus NHS care (columns 2, 4 and 6), the
results indicate that the probability of choosing private care is higher for individuals with larger
wins. This is the case for health services such as dental care, blood pressure check, and cervical
examination. The effect of lottery wins varies by the type of health service. For example, a
10% increase in winnings increases the probability of obtaining a private dental service by 0.15–
0.20 of a standard deviation, whereas the effect is larger for cervical examination (0.74–0.81
of a standard deviation). The estimates demonstrate considerable stability across the different
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specifications of household income.
We consider a different approach in which lottery wins enter the regression as separate
dummy variables representing four win categories, with the reference category being a win of
less than £100. The estimates are presented in Table 3. The coefficients on the variable for
the largest win category (> £500; mean = £1922.5, median = £1058.2) in the regression on
private and public choice are large and statistically significant for blood pressure and cholesterol
checks and cervical exam. For these services, these results show that the positive effect of wins
on the choice of private care is influenced to a great extent by winners with medium to large
winnings. For health services such as dental care and breast exam, the effects of lottery wins
arise from smaller wins of £100−£250. We also observe that the coefficients on smaller wins of
£100−£250 is statistically significant in the utilization of any health care services for cervical
exam, eye test, and overnight hospital care.
As a sensitivity check, we estimate the regressions reported in Table 2 using random-effects
estimation.4 We observed that the probability of choosing private care is higher for individuals
with larger wins for both inpatient care (overnight hospital) as well as outpatient care (e.g.
dental, blood pressure). As noted in Table 2, when time-fixed unobserved characteristics of
individuals are accounted for in the FE specification, the effect of lottery wins for the choice of
private overnight hospitalisation becomes small and insignificant from zero, but this is not the
case for outpatient care. This indicates the importance of time-invariant individual heterogene-
ity in influencing the choice of private hospital care, which appears to play a smaller role for
outpatient health services such as dental care or cervical examination. One plausible explana-
tion may be individuals’ risk aversion toward private hospital expenditure, which is larger and
more uncertain than the cost of private health care in an outpatient setting.
3.2 Lottery wins, private medical insurance, and the choice of private versus
NHS care
The effect of windfall income on health care behaviors is expected to differ depending on whether
individuals have PMI. We investigate the effect of lottery wins on the choice between private
and public health care by re-estimating the FE regression in Table 2, separating the sample
into individuals with and without PMI. We focus on the choice between private and NHS care
4These results are available from the authors upon request.
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because lottery wins have little effect on the utilization of health services, consistent with the
findings in Table 2.
Table 4 shows the estimates of lottery wins on the choice of public and private care by PMI
status. For privately insured individuals, the results indicate that the larger the lottery wins,
the higher the probability of individuals choosing private care for dental, eye, and blood pressure
checks, and cervical examination. One mechanism underlying these results may be that lottery
winners are using their winnings to pay the associated copayments or the private expenses
directly if their PMI contracts do not cover these services. On hospital care, the estimate of
lottery wins on private overnight hospitalization is not statistically significant. This result is
not unexpected for privately insured individuals given that expenditure on private hospital care
is covered under PMI contracts, although the generosity of individual contracts may vary.
For individuals without PMI, the coefficient estimates are not statistically significant indi-
cating that lottery wins have no effect on the choice of private versus NHS hospital care. We
further consider if health care behaviours differ by income in that those without insurance are
more likely to self-fund private health services than those with lower income. We do so by sepa-
rating the non-privately insured sample into two groups, namely individuals with above-median
and below-median incomes. The estimates from both groups are not statistically significant
from zero.5
3.3 Lottery wins and private medical insurance
A potential mechanism by which lotteries may influence health care demand is if lottery wins
are systematically related to individuals’ propensity to have PMI or to switch into PMI. To
investigate this more formally, we refer to Table 5 where we regress PMI status on lottery
wins categories using FE estimation. As discussed in Section 2.2, our sample consists of “ever-
winners” – individuals who have won the lottery at least once in the panel.
The results indicate that winners of medium to large wins (> £500) are more likely to have
PMI. This is the case when the reference categories are winners of smaller wins (≤ £500) and
non winners (shown in (B)), or only non winners (shown in (C)). It bears mentioning that our
results are based on within-individual variation in PMI status. Hence based on the sample of
“ever-winners”, winners with medium to larger wins are more likely to take-up PMI.
5These results are available from the authors upon request.
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3.4 Do lottery winners drop private medical insurance more quickly?
We consider the question of whether lottery winners who take up insurance coverage subse-
quently drop cover more quickly, and we investigate this by examining the relationship between
lottery wins and the duration of insurance coverage. The principal outcome of interest is length
of time (in years) that individuals maintain PMI from the year of insurance coverage com-
mencement. Our sample consists of individuals who are observed to have taken up PMI at any
time in the panel. We accommodate the right censoring of the outcome variable by including a
variable that measures the number of years that individuals remain in the sample, in addition
to an extensive set of covariates as in Table 2.
The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 6. Those shown in columns (1)–
(4) indicate that, of the individuals who pay for their private insurance coverage either directly or
as a deduction from their wages, lottery winners winning more than £500 maintain coverage for
a significantly shorter duration of time than non-winners and smaller winners. More specifically,
large lottery winners drop private insurance coverage between approximately 10 and 11 months
earlier, possibly after their winnings have been exhausted. A similar result is observed for
individuals who pay for their insurance directly, because the size of the coefficients are relatively
close to those of the former. However, these estimates are not statistically significant from zero,
which is probably attributable to low statistical power because of the small sample size.
4 Implied elasticities of health care
A secondary question of this study is whether lottery wins offer plausibly exogenous variation
in individuals’ income from which we may be able to derive estimates of income elasticity of
health care. To this end, we first estimate FE regressions where the dependent variables are
binary and assume the value of 1 if an individual obtained public and private care and 0 if the
individual did not obtain care for a given service. The estimates are then used to calculate the
implied elasticities of public and private health care versus no care with respect to lottery wins.
The elasticity estimates of lottery wins are shown in columns (1) and (3) of Table 7 for public
and private health care, respectively. For public care versus not using health care, the estimated
elasticities are small and statistically insignificant for all the health services considered. In
contrast, for private care versus not using health care, the elasticities are large and statistically
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significant for overnight hospitalisation, chest X-ray, cholesterol test, and cervical exam. For
example, a 1% increase in lottery wins raises the probability that an individual will choose
private care rather than not obtain health care by 0.22% for an overnight hospitalization episode
and by 0.82% for a private cervical examination.
For comparison, we also present in Table 7 the elasticity estimates with respect to household
income for the whole sample consisting of winners and non-winners using FE regression. For
public versus not obtaining care, as shown in columns (2) and (3), the elasticity estimates are
positive for most outpatient services except dental care and negative for overnight hospitalisa-
tion. For some health services (e.g. hospital, blood pressure), the estimates are statistically
significant from zero. For private care versus no care, the elasticities are broadly positive and
large in magnitude. On the whole, the income elasticities appear to be similar in magnitude
and direction to the elasticity of lottery wins, particularly for blood pressure, cholesterol test,
eye-test, and cervical exam. For all types of health services considered in this study, our elas-
ticity estimates indicate that these health care services are normal goods as opposed to luxury
goods.
4.1 Inheritance income
As an additional analysis, we estimate the implied income elasticities on health care with re-
spect to inheritance or bequest income by using a sample of over 3100 individuals who have
reported receiving these types of windfall incomes. These estimates are reported in Table A.2.
The income elasticities for public health care versus no care are small in magnitude and are
statistically insignificant except for cervical examinations. These results are consistent with the
elasticity estimates obtained from lottery winnings, as shown in Table 7.
For private health care, the estimated elasticities are larger in magnitude than those from
public health care and are statistically significant for dental and eye examination services. Al-
though there are some differences (e.g., chest X-ray, cervical) in the sizes of the elasticities
compared with lottery wins, the estimates are generally consistent in both direction and mag-
nitude.
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5 Conclusion
This study exploits lottery wins as a source of exogenous changes in individuals’ income to obtain
causal estimates of lottery income elasticities for health care. We examined a longitudinal sample
of over 14000 lottery winners in the United Kingdom to investigate the impact of lottery wins
on health care demand for a range of health care services in an institutional context in which
health care is provided in both public and private sectors. The results show that, although
lottery wins have little to no effects on the probability that individuals use health care services,
lottery winners with relatively large wins are significantly more likely to choose health care from
the private sector than from the public sector. We find strong evidence supporting this behavior
for health services such as dental care, blood pressure checks, and cervical examination.
The results also show that the effects of lottery wins differ depending on whether individuals
have PMI. For individuals with PMI, larger winners are more likely to obtain private care for
a range of outpatient services (e.g., dental, eye, cervical examination), suggesting that winners
are using their winnings to afford the associated copayments that are not covered under their
PMI contracts. For individuals without PMI, lottery wins have no effect on their health care
seeking behaviours.
The estimates of the implied lottery income elasticities for public health care services are
close to zero, indicating that positive income shocks do not influence the utilization of health
care from the public sector. This is perhaps unsurprising given that financial barriers are not
expected to be important in limiting access to health care provided by the NHS. A universal
health care system does indeed seem to reduce income barriers to health care services yet other
barriers might remain. Conversely, the implied lottery income elasticities for private health care
are positive and in the range of 0 – 0.26 for most of the health services considered, and 0.82
for cervical examination. The FE estimates of household income elasticities are comparable to
those from lottery income; they are in the range of 0.03–0.15, and 0.51 for cervical examinations.
Both sets of estimates are similar to those obtained by Kenkel (1994), who, using United
States data, finds an income elasticity of preventive care of 0.06. Our estimates are smaller
than those obtained in a recent meta-regression analysis, which finds that the income elasticity
of demand for health care is between 0.4 and 0.8 (Costa-Font, Gemmill, and Rubert 2011).
Finally, our results are consistent with evidence from microeconomic studies that support the
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notion that health care is a necessity and not a luxury good.
Our results indicate that an expansion of income in developed countries is likely to increase
the use of private and preventive health care but will leave the use of public health care largely
unchanged.
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Table 4: Estimates of lottery winnings on the choice of private versus NHS care
by insurance status.
Outcome Insurance = Yes Insurance = No
Overnight hospital 0.96 -0.32
(0.96) (0.49)
Blood pressure 0.56* 0.00
(0.32) (0.14)
Chest X-ray 0.24 -0.21
(0.71) (0.27)
Cholesterol test 0.66 -0.22
(0.52) (0.17)
Dental 0.46*** 0.09
(0.17) (0.12)
Eye test 0.56*** 0.07
(0.20) (0.18)
Cervical exam 1.44** 0.37
(0.69) (0.27)
Breast exam 0.81 0.29
(1.29) (0.27)
Note: Significance: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%. Models are estimated us-
ing fixed effects estimation, with robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Dependent variables are standardized and coefficient estimates are inter-
preted as standard deviation changes in health service use for a ten percent
increase in lottery winnings. Other covariates include age and squared-
age, gender, education attainment, employment status, home ownership,
marital status, self-assessed health, health problems, and region identi-
fiers.
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Table 5: Private medical insurance (PMI) status and lottery wins by insurance types
All types Direct payment &
deduct from wages
(1) (2)
(A) Any wins 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.002)
(B) Wins > £500 0.019* 0.005
(0.010) (0.008)
(C) Lottery wins categories:
No wins (Ref)
< £100 0.002 0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
£100−£250 0.004 0.003
(0.008) (0.006)
£250−£500 -0.003 -0.002
(0.011) (0.009)
> £500 0.019* 0.005
(0.010) (0.009)
Observations (N) 52,132 46,489
Note: Significance: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%. Results in columns (1) and (2) are
estimated using fixed effects estimation. Private medical insurance types refer
to how medical insurance is paid for. The sample comprises of individuals that
won the lottery at least once in the panel, lottery players, and consist of both
winners and non-winners in a given year. Covariates include age and squared-
age, gender, education attainment, employment status, home ownership, marital
status, self-assessed health, health problems, and region identifiers.
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Table A.1: Descriptive statistics of winners and non-winners samples
Winners Non-winners
Dependent variable Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev.
Log(real lottery win) 3.576 1.423
Win category: < £100 0.809 0.393
Win category: £100−£250 0.091 0.288
Win category: £250−£500 0.048 0.213
Win category: > £500 0.052 0.223
Log(real household income) 9.126 0.655 9.022 0.711
Private health insurance 0.197 0.398 0.148 0.355
Age 45.342 17.112 45.718 18.424
Female 0.432 0.495 0.558 0.497
Primary 0.213 0.410 0.255 0.436
Secondary 0.018 0.132 0.012 0.110
Low-secondary, vocation 0.324 0.468 0.296 0.457
High-secondary, mid-vocation 0.128 0.334 0.124 0.329
High vocation 0.206 0.405 0.170 0.375
First degree 0.079 0.270 0.103 0.304
High degree 0.024 0.152 0.027 0.161
Education: Undefined 0.008 0.088 0.014 0.118
Employed full-time 0.590 0.492 0.502 0.500
Self-employed 0.075 0.264 0.070 0.256
Unemployed 0.022 0.146 0.035 0.184
Retired 0.180 0.3839 0.203 0.402
Maternity leave 0.004 0.060 0.005 0.070
Family care 0.052 0.221 0.076 0.265
Full-time student 0.034 0.180 0.053 0.224
Disabled 0.039 0.194 0.048 0.213
Government training 0.001 0.029 0.002 0.041
Other type of employment 0.004 0.065 0.007 0.082
Owns home 0.759 0.428 0.736 0.441
Married 0.699 0.459 0.644 0.479
Health: Excellent 0.226 0.418 0.234 0.423
Health: Good 0.481 0.500 0.456 0.498
Health: Fair 0.205 0.404 0.211 0.408
Health: Poor 0.067 0.249 0.078 0.268
Health: Very poor 0.021 0.142 0.022 0.146
Health problems: Arms, Legs etc 0.294 0.456 0.278 0.448
Health problems: Sight 0.050 0.218 0.052 0.222
Health problems: Hearing 0.092 0.289 0.083 0.276
Health problems: Skin conditions 0.141 0.348 0.117 0.321
Health problems: Chest 0.142 0.349 0.135 0.342
Health problems: Heart/Blood pressure 0.182 0.386 0.171 0.377
Health problems: Stomach 0.086 0.280 0.081 0.273
Health problems: Diabetes 0.038 0.191 0.038 0.192
Health problems: Anxiety, depression 0.069 0.253 0.087 0.282
Health problems: Alcohol, drugs 0.005 0.072 0.006 0.074
Health problems: Epilepsy 0.006 0.080 0.009 0.092
Health problems: Migraine 0.084 0.277 0.081 0.272
Health problems: Other 0.050 0.218 0.044 0.206
N 14,205 134,176
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Table A.2: Implied income elasticities of health care
with respect to inheritance income
Public vs. Private vs.
Dependent variable No Care No Care
Overnight hospital 0.039 0.138
Blood pressure 0.013 0.082
Chest X-ray -0.006 0.769
Cholesterol test 0.010 0.033
Dental 0.012 0.058**
Eye test 0.008 0.143***
Cervical exam 0.044* 0.224
Breast exam 0.033 0.171
Note: −a Significance: *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10%. Statistical significance
refers to the regression coefficient estimates, which are estimated using
OLS. Estimates of income elasticities are calculated as percentage change
in the proportion of individuals obtaining public or private care versus
no-care given a one-percent increase in bequest income.
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